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ABSTRACT
This article considers the application and poten-
tial impact of workforce modernisation in Eng-
land and Wales. It highlights some problems
surrounding current police hierarchies and special-
isation particularly in relation to the decline in
visible policing. It suggests that bureaucratic
growth within police forces can be matched to a
decline in effective command and control of police
services. Lengthened chains of command and
narrower spans of control have, within larger
police forces, diluted the supervisory capacity and
effectiveness of police managers. It is argued that
this feature reinforces the need for smaller, more
manageable units of policing. The article thereafter
highlights a central theme identified within
HMIC’s 2004 Thematic Report on Modernising
the Police Service. This is the creation of a career
pathway for all police personnel and, long term,
the ability to move between warranted and non-
warranted police posts. It recognises the positive
position taken by ACPO in relation to modern-
isation. It also draws on data collected from one
workforce modernisation pilot site, Bexley
Operational Command Unit (OCU), particu-
larly in relation to the successful use of police
staff ‘Investigative Support Officers’ in processing
low-level cases. Evidence from the Bexley site
indicates that workforce modernisation strategy
provides the opportunity to improve both overall
police effectiveness and the relationship between
police and community.
INTRODUCTION
Following the decision on the part of the
Home Secretary not to go forward with
the amalgamation of police forces in mid
2006, the new Minister for Policing
Security and Community Safety was to
circulate a letter to all police chiefs and
police authority chairs outlining plans for
ongoing police reform and enhancement of
protective services (Home Office, 2006).
Within this continuing reform programme
the Minister was to highlight the need to
reinforce reform in relation to workforce
development and modernisation ‘so that
policing has the right people with the right
training and skills in the right places’
(Home Office, 2006, p. 1).
WORKFORCE MODERNISATION
Workforce modernisation within the police
service materially reflects the commitment
of New Labour to modernise all public
services to improve their efficiency and
overall capability. The commitment to
reform within the police service has been
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most recently highlighted both by the 2004
HMIC ‘Thematic Report on Modernising
the Police Service’ and latterly by the pilot-
ing in four police force areas of new ‘mixed
economy’ police teams. The mixed econ-
omy teams consist of one police constable
exercising a managerial role over five to
seven police staff who have taken on either
public reassurance policing duties or those
of criminal investigation. Early reports from
the sites indicate that the mixed economy
team approach is proving to be highly suc-
cessful and could be the prelude to sig-
nificant developments in police service
delivery which, if fully implemented, could
fundamentally alter the policing landscape
in England and Wales (Loveday, 2006a).
The nature and extent of reform now
being contemplated reflects the fact that, as
currently configured, police establishment
within the 43 forces may not provide value
for money and often offers little in the way
of remedy for local communities experi-
encing anti-social behaviour which con-
tinues to dominate the agenda in both
urban and rural areas. This has proved to be
most evident in the difficulty which police
services continue to experience in deliver-
ing ‘visible policing’ within local commun-
ities and the concurrent problem of fear of
crime which currently remains the highest
recorded in Europe.
A number of factors both internal and
external to the police may provide some
explanation for this. As currently established
the rank hierarchy and career structure of
the police service may militate against the
better provision of the basic patrol ‘visible
uniformed policing’ within the community.
However, external factors can also be iden-
tified. These would include both ever
increasing public demand for more policing
and linked with and arising from recent
legislation the bureaucratic requirements
placed on the police service, particularly
those relating to the arrest of and charging
of suspects at the police station.
It is nevertheless difficult to explain the
current crisis in the delivery of basic police
services as a consequence of external cir-
cumstances. Many internal factors also
impede the delivery of police services.
These would include the police hierarchy
and career progression at one level and the
lack of effective management at local level.
It would also include current use (or mis-
use) of police staff within many police
forces.
A REDUNDANT POLICE HIERARCHY
As currently constituted the police service
is characterised by an extravagant hierarch-
ical structure that, in its inception, repli-
cated an army rank system established in the
nineteenth century. Every rank was to be
closely supervised by a higher rank with a
numerical component which dictated the
number of senior officers made imme-
diately responsible for their duties. A
defined number of constables would be
made the immediate responsibility of ser-
geants who in turn were responsible to
inspectors and so on up the police hier-
archy. Within any force there will be at least
five supervisory ranks above that of the
constable. If all ranks were to be identified
including that extending to Chief Officer
rank, then the number of supervisory ranks
rises to no fewer than eight more senior
ranks above that of constable.
Career progression for all officers is
through the ranks by way of promotion
usually following paper-based examinations.
Pay rewards are linked to rank rather than
responsibility and it is for this reason that
the patrol function (visible policing) has
never proved to be a way to achieving
professional career success (Loveday, 1998).
This perception has been encouraged where
police forces have traditionally placed
greater emphasis on specialised functions
and services and this was to be best reflected
in the rise of the Criminal Investigation
Loveday
Page 137
Department (CID) where the number of
senior posts available was always greater
than within the uniformed service.
The over-extended police hierarchy has
been the source of bureaucratic growth over
time. It has also, when aligned with police
force amalgamation and specialisation,
generated major management problems in
relation to the effective command and con-
trol of police services. Over a number of
decades (but particularly the 1970s) police
forces were to extend their professional
hierarchies (Young, 1991). With this went
the growth of specialised units which also
were to serve to narrow spans of manage-
ment control significantly. This situation
was to be encouraged by police managers,
particularly in America where the police
professional model of clear functional spe-
cialisation was to be exemplified in the big
city police departments (Wilson, 1950).
Yet as spans of control narrowed and
chains of command lengthened, immediate
supervision of operational officers effec-
tively ceased. Just how big a problem this
could create was to be made manifest in the
activities of the West Midlands Serious
Crime Squad and was to provide a useful
guide to the consequences of extended
hierarchies and narrow spans of control. It
created a lax and largely unmanageable
police structure where operational and
management control could be exercised not
by senior or even ACPO-ranked officers
but by the lowest supervisory rank, that of
sergeant. In the West Midlands it was these
officers who effectively ran the Serious
Crime Squad and were ultimately to bring
the squad into total disrepute (Kaye,
1991).
A solution to the inherent dangers of
extended chains of command and special-
isation was to be temporarily provided by
the arrival in the 1990s of the Basic Com-
mand Unit. This unit of policing was
planned to consist of no more than 250
police officers, a number that could be
effectively managed by one superintendent
(O’Byrne, 2001). Identified as the building
blocks of the police service, the BCU sig-
nificantly expanded spans of control, whilst
also significantly reducing chains of com-
mand. Within the BCU one senior officer
exercised oversight over the whole range of
police functions. Yet despite the benefits
arising from the BCU, the recent history of
these units has been one of steady expan-
sion in establishment to a point where the
average size of the BCU has risen to at least
450 officers and where some BCUs have
establishments of over 1,000 officers
(O’Byrne).
Currently the predisposition to increase
the size of the BCU like that of police
forces appears to be based very largely on
professional judgment rather than any inde-
pendent analysis (O’Byrne, 2001). There
has been little or no attempt by professional
associations to identify what constitutes in
police establishment terms a viable BCU.
The absence of independent evaluation
has been most recently subject to critical
comment by the Police Superintendents
Association whose members are most
immediately, as BCU commanders, con-
fronted with the consequences of this
important managerial failure (Police Super-
intendents Association, 2004).
SPECIALISATION AND THE DECLINE
OF VISIBLE POLICING
One further problem confronting all police
services has been the growth of special-
isation within policing. Specialisation has
been for many years a central feature of
police services (Martin & Wilson, 1969).
However, over recent decades the rise of
specialist units has limited significantly the
ability of police forces to deliver effective
visible policing. This may in part have been
a reflection of the pressures from the centre,
particularly those emanating from Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
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(HMIC), which has required all forces,
whatever their size, to demonstrate a degree
of omni-competence in specialised services
which have been subsequently subject to
close monitoring by HMIC through suc-
cessive annual efficiency reports.
Providing sufficient manpower to sup-
port ever-increasing specialisation was,
however, usually to be sustained at the
expense of visible policing and patrol
strength. This problem was to be identified
and explored in some detail over 20 years
ago by senior police managers who ques-
tioned the need for such specialisation
within all police forces (Jones, 1980). Yet
the problem of police officer ‘abstraction’,
where uniform strength is reallocated to
support specialised functions, continues to
be a critical problem within the current
police system. This in fact has been noted
very recently by a police officer (wishing to
remain anonymous) who has argued that:
As a community beat officer a lot of my
time is now taken up supporting under-
strength shifts rather than performing my
core tasks. I managed to check our shift
rotas back to 1999 and in that period
the number of frontline officers in my
sub-division has dropped by around
30 per cent to 40 per cent, although
various other department strengths have
increased significantly (Police Review,
2006, p. 17).
Professional demands and the identification
of new threats can also impact on the
availability of visible policing presence on
the streets. This has been demonstrated
most recently by the professional assessment
made within HMIC that the inadequacy of
‘protective services’ within the police ser-
vice meant that police forces, as currently
constituted, were not ‘fit for purpose’. In its
2005 Report, ‘Closing the Gap’, HMIC
was to argue for a reconfiguration of poli-
cing around a merger plan to create vast
regional forces with the capacity to provide
and support ‘protective services’ now
deemed a central requirement to contem-
porary policing (HMIC, 2005).
As with BCUs and so too with police
forces, the professional solution to new
challenges always appeared to be based on
ever larger units of policing. Little evidence
of any assessment of costs/benefit analysis of
such organisational change appeared to have
been undertaken (Loveday, 2006b). Statist-
ical evidence presented in support of mer-
gers by HMIC was to be undermined by
independent analysis of the data (Loveday,
2006b). It was to confirm the lack of
methodological rigour that has on occasion
characterised reports presented by HMIC
and that also appeared to be reflected in its
2005 Report, ‘Closing the Gap’ (O’Byrne,
2001).
Yet ironically HMIC had within the
Thematic Report of 2004 already identified
what could prove, if implemented, to be
one of the most cost-effective ways of
improving police efficiency and effective-
ness. The ‘Report on Modernising the
Police Service’ (HMIC, 2004) was to set
out a future strategy of reform that sought
for the first time to professionalise the
police service while also making much
more effective use of all of those employed
within it.
HMIC THEMATIC REPORT ON
MODERNISING THE POLICE SERVICE
At the time of its publication, HMIC’s
Thematic Report (HMIC, 2004) received
very little publicity. This did less than justice
to the nature of reform of the police service
proposed within it. It challenged decades of
police resistance to change by recommend-
ing the end of a single entry point into the
police service and its replacement by mul-
tiple entry points and the creation of com-
mon conditions of service for all police
staff. It also recommended the introduction
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of standard pension rights and alongside this
a system of professional registration and
development programmes for all employees.
This would be matched by a clear career
pathway for all staff and the opportunity for
these to move between ‘warranted and non-
warranted police posts’. If these proposals
are implemented they represent the biggest
leap made by police forces towards mod-
ernisation since their inception in the early
nineteenth century.
Among a range of reforms, perhaps the
most significant would be a formalisation
and extension of the use of police powers to
many more members of the ‘extended
police family’. This would include roads
policing, patrol, escort, detention and
investigation and response duties that cur-
rently fall to police officers alone. In line
with this the government has initiated
within recent and planned legislation the
use of police staff to run custody suits and
to enable Police Community Support
Officers (PCSOs) to exercise limited police
powers, operationally, in the exercise of
their duties. The expansion of support staff
responsibilities has in part reflected the
interesting responses received by HMIC
from police forces concerning their greater
use in the delivery of police services. Of the
41 police forces questioned nearly 66 per
cent said that in future police staff could be
used to carry out stop-and-search functions;
a third stated that staff could be used to
make arrests. A majority of forces (60 per
cent) also said that police staff could carry
out covert policing duties (Herbert &
Gower, 2004).
RESPONSE OF THE POLICE
FEDERATION
The recommendations of HMIC were to
be met perhaps not surprisingly with deep
suspicion by the Police Federation, towards
the attitude and views of which, it is fair to
say, the main political parties continue to
exhibit what appears to be a permanent
apprehension. Indeed, an early draft of the
HMIC Thematic Report was to be leaked
to the press to coincide with the Federa-
tion’s 2004, Bournemouth Annual Con-
ference, presumably to ensure that, in this
arena at least, the Thematic Report would
benefit from the full glare of publicity
that its contents were deemed to warrant
(Herbert & Gower, 2004). Yet despite
Police Federation opposition, the interest-
ing feature of the modernisation pro-
gramme is the fragmented nature of the
response to it among other police associ-
ations. This presents a remarkable contrast
to the united response to the Sheehy and
Posen Reviews of the 1990s. Sheehy sought
to introduce a system of universal contracts
and performance pay to all police officers,
while the Posen review planned to remove
many service functions (and funding) from
the police service altogether. Unlike these
earlier inquiries and reviews there is now no
unified opposition to this reform among
police associations. Indeed, both ACPO and
more significantly the Police Superintend-
ents Association have welcomed many of
HMIC’s recommendations.
POSITIVE RESPONSE TO POLICE
MODERNISATION BY ACPO
Evidence of the degree to which ACPO has
risen to the challenge presented by the
Thematic Report was to be highlighted
within a draft report entitled ‘ACPO’s
vision for workforce modernisation’
released in early 2006. Condemning the
existing workforce model as obsolete and
characterised by inefficiency and restrictive
practices, the draft report embraces mod-
ernisation of working practices and favours
the introduction of mixed teams for the
delivery of a range of police services. Mixed
teams led by a police constable will consist
very largely of police support staff, each of
whom can be expected to exercise police
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powers in relation to a specific function
such as investigation or neighbourhood
policing. It is argued that an optimal mix of
police support officers and constables could,
when linked to ending outdated work
practices and employment conditions, sub-
stantially increase police output.
The outdated practices alluded to within
ACPO’s draft report are also likely to
extend to both police pay negotiating
arrangements and the current police dis-
cipline system. Interestingly both of these
are now also subject to fundamental review.
It is perhaps for this reason that the Police
Federation has recently launched a national
campaign driven from the regions against
the modernisation programme. The Federa-
tion has described the ACPO draft report as
a ‘frightening document’ within which
direct entry was seen as the most startling
element. It wants to ensure that the prin-
ciple that all police officers ‘start on the
shop floor’ is preserved (Martis, 2006).
Yet the real challenge may be the recom-
mendation by ACPO both to introduce
common career paths for non-warranted,
partially warranted and fully warranted
officers and also to establish opportunities
for common career progression. This ele-
ment of modernisation is likely to reflect, at
least in part, the evident success of com-
munity support officers and their future
expansion. It is also a belated recognition
that police support staff now constitute up
to one-third of all police force personnel,
and their potential skills should be har-
nessed more effectively by the police
service.
PILOTING WORKFORCE
MODERNISATION
Preliminary results of workforce modern-
isation from the pilot sites are encouraging
and should lead to much wider utilisation of
the modernisation programme. In the
county of Surrey, 26 constables have been
replaced with 5 ‘mixed economy teams’
composed of 1 constable, 3 investigative
assistants and 1 administrative assistant. The
constable becomes the line manager for a
small team of trained police staff technicians
who exercise limited police powers. By
increasing police support staff numbers it
has been found that a great deal more
service delivery hours can be provided to
Surrey’s residents. Moreover, an analysis of
crime resolution in the county was to reveal
that in only a small percentage of cases were
the high level skills of a detective actually
needed. Most crime dealt with involved
handling property, taking statements and
personal assistant skills.
In response Surrey has now introduced
investigative assistants made responsible for
processing most volume crime in the force
area. An initial evaluation of the investiga-
tion teams suggests there have been big
gains. Average investigation time has fallen
from 26 to 15 days while the detection rate
has risen by 14 per cent. Surrey police
report similar positive results with their
neighbourhood policing teams. These con-
sist of 1 constable, 3 PCSOs and 1 admin-
istrative assistant. Already steep rises in
public confidence have been recorded in
the pilot sites since their introduction
(Police Professional, 2005a, p. 11).
EXPERIENCE OF BEXLEY
OPERATIONAL COMMAND UNIT
Similar results have been recorded at the
Bexley pilot site. As in Surrey, an evaluation
of traditional investigation procedures was
to find that the average investigation time
per case was 50 days with 60 per cent of the
time engaged on any investigation identi-
fied as ‘non-investigation work’ (Police Pro-
fessional, 2005b, p. 20). In Bexley the pilot
sites have recorded a dramatic fall in invest-
igation time from 50 to 16 days. Detections
as a percentage of crime have also increased
significantly. For the first time ever, it is
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reported, the detection rate is expected to
reach close to 30 per cent of recorded crime
(Police Professional, p. 21).
In Bexley police staff now make up a
third of personnel employed in crime
investigation teams and further expansion in
the use of police staff is now planned. This
expansion is based partly on the interesting
discovery that members of the public
appear happy to deal with any member of
the Metropolitan police service and that
they ‘do not seem overly worried if that
person is an actual police officer or not’
(Police Professional, 2005b, p. 21).
The Bexley pilot’s use of ‘investigative
support officers’ has allowed professionally
trained detectives to direct their attention to
more serious offences. Time made available
to them through the use of Investigative
Support Officers (ISOs) has allowed more
crime to be ‘screened in’. As was to be
identified by the OCU commander, the
first area of interest within the pilot proved
to be, perhaps not surprisingly, the invest-
igation and management of crime (MPS,
2006). The first major change emanating
from workforce modernisation proved to be
ending the system whereby a police invest-
igating officer exercised complete respons-
ibility for each case ‘from cradle to grave’.
In Bexley, the current concept of detect-
ive officers assuming responsibility for every
aspect of a case within which they person-
ally carry out every activity linked to an
investigation (including collecting all wit-
ness statements and setting up ID parades),
has been effectively brought to an end.
With 13 ISOs detectives are now able to
look at new and more challenging roles.
Most of the more mundane duties are made
the responsibility of the ISO. The use of
ISOs and the new division of labour within
the investigation process that this represents,
has had a significant impact on the overall
length of investigation time taken for each
case which has fallen dramatically (MPS,
2006).
Using ISOs has also been matched by the
use of volunteers to take on the often
extremely time-consuming responsibility of
viewing all local CCTV tapes. This has also
had an immediate impact in Bexley where
it has allowed for more crime to be
‘screened in’ and also for many more
positive leads to be followed up by police
investigators (MPS, 2006). In Bexley the
aim was now to retain the mixed staffing
model as their utility had quickly been
appreciated. They had also been made re-
sponsible for answering all non-emergency
calls from the public. Here it was to be
subsequently discovered around a third of
non-emergency calls did not in fact require
a police response at all (MPS). In Bexley the
use of Community Support Officers to deal
with these calls had served to ‘profession-
alise the mundane’ which police officers
often did not want to deal with but which
did engage the local community (MPS).
One indication of the way in which
workforce modernisation could extend to
operational policing had been the use of
Community Support Officers on Local
Response Teams (LRTs). This was seen as
probably the most ‘controversial area of
police business’ and while the Police Fed-
eration had made reference to ‘mission
creep’, police officers serving on LRTs
were to prove very supportive of the inclu-
sion of CSO’s (MPS, 2006). Interestingly, in
relation to the expanded use of CSOs,
analysis of local police communications in
Bexley was to demonstrate that currently
police officers were now 19 times more
likely to call for PCSOs than were PCSOs
to call for police officer support (MPS).
As in other pilot sites the overall assess-
ment of workforce modernisation has
proved to be very positive. The extended
use of police staff and CSOs had enabled
the forces involved to increase their per-
formance and improve their visibility
accountability while also contributing to
greater consumer satisfaction. Evidence
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from Bexley was to lead the OCU com-
mander to comment critically on the cur-
rent ‘political paranoia’ which surrounded
police numbers, when the real need was to
give greater freedom locally to police man-
agers who should be allowed to use the
resources so released where they were most
needed (MPS, 2006).
IMPACT OF MODERNISATION
The implications of the workforce modern-
isation programme have not, as yet, been
fully appreciated. However, some indication
of the level of senior management commit-
ment to its realisation has been highlighted
by the secondment of a senior Home Office
official to the Metropolitan Police Service
(MPS) to oversee the introduction of the
modernisation programme within that ser-
vice. It is the Metropolitan Commissioner’s
intention to show a clear lead in the greater
use of police staff within the modernisation
process and the creation of more flexible
entry points into the service for qualified
staff. Along with the mixed economy teams
will also go a major expansion in PCSOs.
In terms of numbers these are expected to
peak at around 24,000 officers in 2008,
although there may yet be a case for further
expansion thereafter (Haynes, 2006).
These developments are linked to other
significant reforms that will impact on the
police service. One has been highlighted
within the Review into Police Disciplinary
Arrangements (Taylor, 2005) within which
a major recommendation is that future
police disciplinary arrangements should fol-
low the practice laid down by ACAS. This it
believes will begin to bring modern man-
agement practice into the police discipline
system. One further challenge to traditional
police shibboleths can be expected to arise
ironically from the creation of the Serious
and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
established under the Police Reform Act
2002.
One unintended consequence of the cre-
ation of SOCA has been the discovery that
it could lead to the probable demise of the
‘office of constable’ as, within the Police
Reform Act 2002, any member of SOCA
can now be given all the powers of the
constable. These powers can be expected in
future to be exercised by, for example, HM
Revenue & Customs officers and Immigra-
tion officers, who will be serving within
SOCA ‘for an indefinite time’ (Police
Review, 2005). These officers will not,
however, be constables but SOCA ‘employ-
ees’. This is a significant development but
can be expected to contribute to the overall
workforce modernisation process.
CONCLUSION
Workforce modernisation, if implemented,
could fundamentally alter the policing land-
scape in England and Wales. It could also
help professionalise the police service and
finally bring to an end its traditional ‘blue
collar’ status. To achieve this, however, it is
clear that many barriers erected over the
years to protect and preserve police officer
interests, but that now serve to impede
service delivery, will need to be abandoned.
Many of these would be the first casualties
within the detailed programme presented
within HMIC’s Thematic Report on mod-
ernisation of the police service.
There remains, however, a political
dimension that could nevertheless act as a
brake on the modernisation process.
Modernisation is at least in part predicated
on expanding support officer numbers by
reducing current police establishment. If
the proposals outlined at the 2005 ACPO
conference by the Chief Constable of Sur-
rey were implemented, it was estimated that
the programme could mean a reduction in
overall police establishment from the cur-
rent 140,000 to just over 90,000 nationally
(Police Professional, 2005a). This interesting
prediction may have explained the unusual
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reticence of the then Home Secretary in his
response to the Surrey pilot.
This was entirely explained by the fact
that the size of police establishment is now a
well-established virility test between the
main political parties. Within the world of
political party competition a primary con-
cern relates to police numbers rather than
what police officers do. For the modernisa-
tion programme to begin to unfold, some
difficult political challenges will therefore
also have to be confronted. How New
Labour responds to this challenge in a post-
merger environment will provide an
important measure of its commitment to
workforce modernisation in the police
service. It may also provide a litmus test to
the government’s commitment to mean-
ingful reform within the public sector
overall.
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